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Abstract 
This essay examines how the U.S. Declaration of Independence justified revolution 
in the midst of a volatile set of political exigencies. To engage and conciliate those 
colonists who held fragile or ambivalent attitudes toward the idea of 
independence, this short document strove to construct a narrative that vindicated 
mass political upheaval and laid an explanatory groundwork for the efforts to 
come. The Declaration is more than a starting point; it was negotiated within 
history at a specific juncture, and informed by the intellectual climate of the 18th 
century. I argue that its pivotal strategy marshals a Deist conception of Reason 
equated with transcendent Natural Law. The result is a rhetorically constructed 
narrative of resigned inevitability.   
Key Words: nationhood, rhetoric, propaganda, American 
Revolution, Deism  
Introduction 
At the signing of the United States’ Declaration of Independence in July 1776, the 
thirteen colonies had been at war with Great Britain for over a year. However, since 
the first shots were fired fifteen months prior, few public officials had directly 
advocated the merits and viability of national self-governance. It was not until the 
publication of Thomas Paine’s Common Sense in February 1776 (a text that sold 
over 100,000 copies) that the proposition became widely circulated. Five months 
later, the colonies declared that independence.  
The idea of America was novel; no such thing as an American existed. At 
the time of the Declaration’s publication, the colonial army was stretched in its 
efforts and success was not certain. While polyphonic in that it was directed also 
towards European governments (acquiring French military assistance required that 
the dispute be transfigured beyond an internal British affair), the Declaration was 
an effort to secure the backing of those colonists whose allegiances were not yet 
finalized. This was a challenging proposition: convincing colonists to sever bonds 
with what was, at the time, the world’s most powerful empire, and for many their 
country of birth. 
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In revisiting the Declaration, one of the exceptional liberation texts of 
world history, I aim to address both rhetorical invention and historical context. The 
following examines how the document justified revolution in the midst of a 
volatile set of political exigencies. To engage and conciliate the broad swath of 
colonists who held fragile or ambivalent attitudes toward the idea of 
independence, this short document strove to construct a narrative that vindicated 
mass political upheaval and laid an explanatory groundwork for the efforts to 
come. Historian David Armitage argues that the Declaration’s principal objective 
“was to express the international legal sovereignty of the United States” (21). It was 
targeted also to colonists whose support was tentative but essential. 
The Declaration is more than a catalyst and starting point; it was 
negotiated within history at a specific juncture of politics, ideology, and 
geography. Context matters (Mercieca, 4). To set background, I first situate the 
work in relation to eighteenth century North Atlantic political philosophy. For 
social and political climate, I look also at texts by William Pitt, Patrick Henry, 
Thomas Paine, and James Varnum: texts that, read together, indicate the diverse 
political attitudes in circulation at the time. Each employs rhetorical tactics to 
advocate either engagement in combat, or diplomatic and political compromise. 
Each addresses the idea of an ethical war, and targets a specific audience. A 
thorough historical study would additionally compare the Declaration to related 
government texts such as the Articles of Confederation (1781) and the United 
States Constitution (1789). My focus is different; I concentrate on the Declaration 
and its significance to rhetorical theory. 
This essay conceptualizes rhetoric as a pragmatic art that has a job to do in 
the world. As such, I explore how principal author Jefferson navigated multiple 
ambiguities in addressing the Declaration to its plural audiences. However, my 
central argument is that the Declaration strategically marshals a Deist conception 
of Reason equated with transcendent law and thereby achieves a narrative of 
resigned inevitability and collective necessity. Both formidable propaganda and 
poetic national touchstone, the document is orchestrated to be dignified, 
regretful, gentlemanly, and inescapable. I suggest that cultivating this aura of 
predetermination, the setting forth of one’s propositions as a foregone conclusion, 
is a central goal of rhetorical practice and that the Declaration brilliantly embodies 
this strategy. 
In an 1882 lecture at the Sorbonne, Ernest Renan argued that nations are a 
spiritual principle based on a shared history, collective project, and unifying story 
(42-55). One hundred years later, Benedict Anderson suggested that we think of 
nations as “imagined communities” constituted by shared narratives and 
correlated amnesias (204). More recently, Michael Bruner has argued that national 
identities are “malleable fictions, assembled out of available historical resources 
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and incessantly negotiated” through public life (3). All three insights highlight the 
symbolic foundations of national community. However, although I agree that 
national identities are flexible, complex and contested, they are also much more 
than that: they are durable, resilient, and not easily discarded. Robust cultures are 
fostered through political socialization, and their boundaries are “securely 
guarded, their narratives purified, their rituals carefully monitored” (Benhabib 7). 
Ultimately open to re-imagination, collective identities are the legacy of 
compelling stories. Creation of the United States of America was not inevitable, but 
the Declaration was an extraordinary and pivotal step towards making it appear so.  
Political Context 
The American Revolution was both an international war (the Americans would not 
likely have won without French assistance), and a civil war (throughout the 
revolution, loyalists constituted approximately one-quarter of the American 
colonies’ population, and approximately 75,000 loyalists fled abroad at its end, 
most to the north) (Jasanoff, 6, 8). Above all, the outcome was not assured. One 
might profitably ask why the territories of what is now Canada did not declare 
independence from Great Britain either during the War of Independence or later 
during the War of 1812. Such was Thomas Jefferson’s confidence that the British 
territories to the north would be easily conquered during the latter war (perhaps 
welcoming the U.S. ‘liberation’), that he declared the conquest of the northern 
colonies to be “a matter of marching” (as cited in Bernstein 205). This 
characterization of the northern territories proved misguided. However, 
opposition was also prevalent in the south. 
In the late eighteenth century, public sentiment in the thirteen colonies 
regarding self-governance was pending and openly contested. In 1769, a debate 
took place at Rhode Island College titled: “Whether British America can under 
present circumstances consistent with good policy, affect to become an 
independent state.” This was a staged event (an initial question was set by the 
college; one person argued for the question, and the second person argued 
against). However, it also indicates the presence of substantial uncertainty 
regarding the idea of independence, and suggests the complex landscape wherein 
the Declaration was conceived. Varnum summarized a prevalent line of thought in 
arguing: “From England we have received our existence, and to her are we 
indebted for protection.” Proceeding to stress a corporeal objection to the idea of 
independence, he warned: “Shouldst thou lift a rebellious hand, blood would run 
down thy streets as a stream, and death in every dreary form, would stalk through 
the land” (18-19). 
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It is worth noting that such debates were not confined to the colonies; 
across the Atlantic, the revolutionaries had the support of powerful individuals. 
Addressing England’s Parliament in 1775, William Pitt gave a speech that indicates 
the range of viewpoints animating the political terrain at the time. Protesting the 
American Colonial War (as it was known), he charged the English government with 
ignoring the colonists’ justified grievances against the Crown, transforming a 
minor diplomatic problem into an expensive and self-destructive foreign war, and 
weakening England’s defences against her real enemies. Pitt asserted: “I love and 
honor the English troops. I know their virtues and their valor. I know they can 
achieve anything—except impossibilities. And I know that the conquest of English 
America is an impossibility” (para. 84). Such appeals went unheeded by the British 
government and Crown. The Declaration was thus authored in the midst of war 
(civil, revolutionary, and international) with the world’s most powerful empire.  
Rhetorical Context 
Armitage writes that Jefferson crafted the Declaration “without any earlier models 
to guide him” (140). Following a restricted definition of genre this may be true, but 
the claim evades a broader context. Jefferson openly acknowledged that the 
Declaration drew upon both antiquity and continental thought. In an 1823 letter to 
James Madison he indicated that he “did not consider it part of my charge to 
invent new ideas” (as cited in Maier 124). Two years later, he again outlined his 
(recalled) motivations in creating the text. He wrote that it “Neither aim[ed] at 
originality of principle or sentiment,” but was nonetheless “intended to be an 
expression of the American mind” (as cited in Howell 463). Significant here is the 
reference to a novel “American mind” – a collective identity distinct from the 
colonial relationship with England. Still more important, I believe, is the 
remembrance of the revolution as unavoidable. In the same letter, Jefferson 
declared that “forced, therefore, to resort to arms for redress,” the signatories 
aimed “to place before mankind the common sense of the subject, in terms so 
plain and firm as to command their assent, and to justify ourselves in the 
independent stand we are compelled to take.” This reference to a reluctant yet 
“forced” and “compelled” public asserts the theme of dispassionate inevitability. 
Scholars have approached the Declaration from a range of perspectives. 
Garry Wills claims that the document may be read as three discrete genres: a 
political document (adopted by Congress), a philosophical treatise (as authored by 
Jefferson), and a symbol of nationhood (a product of later reinterpretation). With 
respect to the last point, Wills asserts that the Declaration created thirteen 
countries with little in common and that it was only in the following century that 
the text was imagined to have bound the heterogeneous colonial governments 
into a unified America. Amanda Emerson foregrounds the document’s negotiated 
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status, a result of twin pressures emanating from “Enlightenment humanism and 
emerging modern nationalism” (97-98), while Jay Fliegelman emphasizes the 
Declaration’s performative dimensions. Arguing that it “was written to be read 
aloud” (4), he claims that non-aural readings offer an impoverished experience of 
the text. 
More germane to this essay, several authors have meticulously outlined 
the Declaration’s intellectual roots. Wills traces this heritage to the Scottish 
Enlightenment, especially the works of Thomas Reid, David Hume, Adam Smith, 
Lord Kames, Adam Ferguson, and Francis Hutcheson, and argues that as a 
document “Written in the lost language of the Enlightenment” (xiv), the 
Declaration is often misunderstood by contemporary audiences. Howell, rather, 
draws a parallel between the text’s argumentation patterns and popular 
eighteenth century structures of logic (464-465). In an exceptional study of the 
Declaration’s rhetorical style, Stephen Lucas situates the work in relation to 
eighteenth century thought and argues that “the task of rhetorical invention 
facing Jefferson and the Committee of Five was not to create something utterly 
original, but to discover in existing materials those that would best sustain 
America’s case for independence” (“The Rhetorical” 146). Lucas argues that the 
document lies squarely in the genre of earlier British and Dutch political discourse, 
specifically deposition apologias and revolutionary parliamentary declarations of 
the seventeenth century, and the 1581 Plakkaat van Verlatinge (wherein the Dutch 
Low Countries formally cut ties with Spain by issuing a declaration of 
independence) (151). 
By reading the Declaration and contemporaneous documents as rhetorical 
artefacts, this essay builds upon Lucas’s foundational work. However, while Lucas’s 
method is to demonstrate the text’s artistic sophistication through microscopic 
analysis (down to the level of the syllable) (“Justifying” 69), my aim is to address the 
Declaration’s long-term rhetorical and political significance. By taking a macro 
perspective, I foreground the document’s mobilization of a compelling persuasive 
strategy: the rhetoric of resigned inevitability. That said, I fully agree with Lucas’s 
assertion that the document was (and is) a targeted rhetorical act (“The Rhetorical” 
144). The belief that understanding and passion must both be kindled to spark 
action was commonplace in eighteenth century England. Indeed, “British 
advocates of enlightenment grudgingly accepted that while logic could inform the 
reason, rhetoric was necessary to rouse the will to action” (Miller, 227). A skilled 
narrator, Jefferson crafted a document that aligns with this worldview (Browne). 
Despite its affectations of impartial objectivity, the text is brilliantly composed to 
maximize rhetorical impact. In an earlier study, Lucas analyzes the Declaration’s 
rhetorical structure and illustrates how, as a concise “propaganda document” (“The 
Stylistic” 7) that “dignifies the Revolution as a contest of principle” (1) the text 
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constructs “a simple moral drama in which a patiently suffering people 
courageously defend their liberty against a cruel and vicious tyrant” (9). In 
outlining the Declaration’s argumentative form, Lucas notes that the majority of 
eighteenth century readers would have agreed that citizens had a right to 
overthrow a tyranny if all other solutions had failed. The key question in 1776 was 
therefore “whether the necessary conditions for revolution existed in the colonies” 
(3). To justify revolution, Jefferson thus launched an extended set of charges 
against George III. Strategically ambiguous, the majority lack specific reference to 
names, dates, or locations – a tactic that made the charges difficult to confute and 
fostered a sense of a systematic “history of repeated injuries and usurpations” 
(para. 2). 
This essay locates the Declaration in eighteenth century North Atlantic 
thought. However, one must also account for the influence of classical texts. In a 
letter written in April 1824, Jefferson signalled his respect for such writings:      
In a republican nation whose citizens are to be led by reason and 
persuasion and not by force, the art of reasoning becomes of first 
importance. In this line antiquity has left us the finest models for 
imitation, and he who studies and imitates them most nearly will 
nearest approach the perfection of the art. (Cited in Wills 483-484) 
One year later, Jefferson named several classical authors by name in referencing 
“elementary books of public right, as Aristotle, Cicero, Locke, Sidney, etc” (as cited 
in Howell 463). The work of Cicero, specifically, was foundational to eighteenth 
century continental rhetorical theory. To map the Declaration’s intellectual roots, I 
thus briefly trace its strategic origins in De Oratore wherein Cicero sets forth the 
significance of rhetoric and defines traits of an imagined ideal orator.      
Jefferson and his co-authors may have been confident that they knew what 
was best for the young colonies (as an imagined political construct), but they 
required a compelling explanation of, and justification for, a revolutionized status 
quo. Cicero’s conception of rhetoric allowed for just such persuasive power. He 
counsels: “there is … no more excellent thing than the power, by means of oratory, 
to get a hold on assemblies of men, win their good will, direct their inclinations 
wherever the speaker wishes, or divert them from whatever he wishes” (I.8). 
Crucially, Cicero’s ideal orator works towards the common good; the aim of oratory, 
he asserts, is “to win over the audience’s sympathy, to prove what is true, and to 
stir their emotions to the desired action” (II.115). The parameters of truth and the 
common good, of course, are contested. This was definitively the case in the 
context of the American Revolution. “Accommodated to political exigencies” 
(Remer 136), Cicero’s line of thinking is Machiavellian in that (higher) ends justify 
(conventionally) unethical means. When Cicero declares that one must at times 
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speak in ways “not only wanting in discretion, but positively unseemly and 
disgraceful” (I.53.227), the elastic nature of rhetorical practice is clear. In Cicero’s 
case the higher ends and common good were tied to the Republic’s well being. 
Jefferson’s case was the reverse; the empire was the antagonist. His task was to 
reinvent the historical relationship between the colonies and Great Britain in a 
manner that repositioned the colonists as the seat of moral integrity and guarantor 
of social well-being.  
Alluding to the emancipatory potential of rhetorical practice, Cicero 
advised that eloquence may be “so kingly, so worthy of the free, so generous, as to 
bring help to the suppliant, to raise up those that are cast down, to bestow 
security, to set free from peril, to maintain men in their civil rights” and “challenge 
the wicked man” (I.8.32). Jefferson and the Declaration’s signatories strove to 
summon (or at least channel) each of these magnificent qualities. Their strategy 
was grounded in the unassailable principles of “self-evident” truths: “Life, Liberty 
and the pursuit of Happiness” (para. 2). Life is universal, and as the “common aim” 
of all men (Aristotle I.4.1360b), so to is “happiness.” The Declaration thus presented 
colonists with a choice between two political orders: divinely endowed Liberty 
(correlated with mandatory revolution), or unnatural bondage. 
Moral Duty 
A fundamental rhetorical objective is to encourage audiences to believe they share 
an author’s motivations. In the formulation of Cicero, “love is won if you are 
thought to be upholding the interests of your audience” (II.51). A rhetor, in other 
words, must be able to follow Demosthenes’ lead in the Third Philippic: “If you want 
to hear without flattery what is in your best interests, I am ready to speak” (4). The 
argument proceeds: I have sound arguments, the substance of which you may 
dislike; others have immoral or inaccurate arguments that you may find appealing. 
While the course of action proposed may entail sacrifice, that sacrifice is made in 
defence of core shared ethical commitments. This is (raw) truth, and it is my ethical 
responsibility to share it with you. The Declaration’s opening sentence is 
structured along equivalent lines: 
When in the Course of human events it becomes necessary for one 
people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them 
with another and to assume among the powers of the earth, the 
separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of 
Nature’s God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of 
mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel 
them to the separation. (para. 1) 
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Reference to the revolutionaries’ collective “decent respect to the opinions of 
mankind” enacts decorum and exemplifies appeal to ethos. The signatories’ 
motivations are presented as both honourable and nonpartisan as they repudiate 
culpability for a discretionary war (this being simply one more “necessary” 
occasion in the long “course of human events”). Assuming fundamental “powers of 
the earth,” the revolutionaries become as routine as a lightning storm: notable 
perhaps, but organic and irrepressible. 
This tactical allusion to moral duty (and personal sacrifice) recurs in a 1775 
speech by Henry (who led the fight against the reconciliation plan with England). 
Regarding war as inevitable, Henry presented resolutions for arming the Virginia 
militia and declared:  
Should I keep back my opinions at such a time through fear of 
giving offense, I should consider myself as guilty of treason 
towards my Country…. For my part, whatever anguish of spirit it 
may cost, I am willing to know the whole truth, to know the worst, 
and to provide for it (paras. 1-2).  
One year later, Paine wrote a similar passage that attacks political inertia: 
Perhaps the sentiments contained in the following pages, are not 
yet sufficiently fashionable to procure them general favor; a long 
habit of not thinking a thing wrong, gives it a superficial 
appearance of being right, and raises at first a formidable outcry in 
defence of custom. (para. 1) 
Arguing for a cessation of hostilities across the Atlantic, Pitt employed a 
corresponding allusion to principle: “My lords, I have submitted to you, with the 
freedom and truth which I think my duty, my sentiments on your present awful 
situation” (para. 101).  
Aware of the resistance their message would face, the Declaration’s 
authors employed an analogous line of reasoning. Constrained by the twin 
requirements of demonstrating both prudent respect for the colonies’ ties to Great 
Britain, as well as a compelling justification for that relationship’s dissolution, 
Jefferson wrote: 
Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established 
should not be changed for light and transient causes; and 
accordingly all experience hath shewn that mankind are more 
disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable than to right 
themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. 
(para. 2) 
92         P. BELANGER 
Rhetor: Journal of the Canadian Society for the Study of Rhetoric   vol. 6 (2016) 
The latter half of this passage delicately navigates the line between custom and 
evolution. The central question is: how did those advocating revolution supersede 
social inertia? I argue that to supplant custom and tradition, the Declaration’s 
authors marshalled the eighteenth century trope of Reason. 
Reason 
Crafted in an intellectual climate that celebrated balance, order, and restraint, the 
Declaration was a product of the Enlightenment and influenced by Deist 
philosophy. James Herrick has analyzed the seventeenth century debate between 
Deists and Christianity’s defenders and summarizes a key tenet of Deist thought: 
“Not even the divinity is free to interrupt the rational laws governing nature…. 
Reason does not bow to tradition, authority, or revelation” (27). In sum, Reason 
equates to absolute, inviolable Natural Law.    
It is worth remembering that Reason is an elaborate word, often 
simultaneously claimed by fierce (and doggedly rational) opponents. Six months 
after the signing of the Declaration, rhetorical theorist George Campbell gave a 
sermon in Aberdeen, Scotland where he demanded: “Have these false friends and 
sham patriots inflamed their minds with imaginary invasions of their rights, and 
with fears and jealousies for which there is no foundation” (17). Criticizing the war 
(rebellion)’s justification he asserted:  
Nothing could vindicate this conduct but the most flagrant danger 
of our religion, laws, and liberties. And I will venture to affirm, and 
am in no hazard of being contradicted by the candid and judicious, 
that these great national concerns were never in less danger from 
the ruling powers, than in the present reign (18). 
These words indicate that Jefferson’s professed transcendent justifications were by 
no means universally accepted. Yet appeal to Natural Law constitutes the 
Declaration’s crux.  
Despite many colonists’ efforts to salvage the relationship, the Declaration 
asserts that a threshold has been reached whereat the laws of Nature mandate 
revolution: “when a long train of abuses and usurpations … evinces a design to 
reduce [the people] under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to 
throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security” 
(para. 2). The phrase “evinces a design” might translate as ‘the king has not in fact 
done anything despotic.’ As Lucas asserts, many of the charges against George III 
were “flimsy at best” (“The Stylistic” 7). Nonetheless, assuming the worst, the 
Declaration’s signatories self-identify as dispassionate and upright “guards for [the] 
future” (para. 2). 
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Jefferson reinforces his argument by illustrating the colonists’ patience, 
humility and perseverance in past efforts to achieve a diplomatic solution to 
ongoing injuries. The passage, “In every stage of these Oppressions We have 
Petitioned for Redress in the most humble terms,” echoes Henry’s earlier assertion 
that “we have done everything that could be done to avert the storm which is now 
coming on. We have petitioned, we have remonstrated, we have supplicated, we 
have prostrated ourselves before the throne.” Henry here conjures a false 
dichotomy – a decision to be made that is “nothing less than a question of 
freedom or slavery.” The alternative to war, he asserts, entails “lying supinely on 
our backs and hugging the delusive phantom of hope until our enemies shall have 
bound us hand and foot” (para. 4). With more subdued wording the Declaration 
states, “Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated injury. A 
Prince, whose character is thus marked by every act which may define a Tyrant, is 
unfit to be the ruler of a free people” (para. 30). Denoting ambivalence, the word 
“may” is slippery. Nevertheless, in contrast to Henry’s speech, Jefferson strikes a 
more august sensibility in response to the perceived British failure to address the 
colonists’ diplomatic initiatives. Had the king behaved as a monarch should under 
Natural Law, the social order would remain satisfactory. However the Crown has 
transgressed its duty, and the colonists are thus compelled to redefine the 
relationship. The colonists, Jefferson asserts, “have appealed to [our British 
brethren’s] native justice and magnanimity, and we have conjured them by the ties 
of our common kindred to disavow these usurpations, which would inevitably 
interrupt our connections and correspondence” (para. 31). It is worth here recalling 
the words of Pitt as he addressed the English Parliament in 1775: 
If I were an American, as I am an Englishman, while a foreign troop 
was landed in my country, I never would lay down my arms—
never—never—never…. In a just and necessary war, to maintain 
the rights or honor of my country I would strip the shirt from my 
back to support it. But in such a war as this, unjust in its principle, 
impracticable in its means, and ruinous in its consequences, I 
would not contribute a single effort nor a single shilling. (paras. 86, 
100)  
In light of Pitt’s petition, Jefferson’s allusion to deaf English ears is at best an 
equivocation. However, as a rhetorical manoeuvre, this reference to an irrational 
and unreceptive enemy bolstered his grounds. Stressing the inescapable nature of 
revolution, Henry asserted, “If we were base enough to desire it, it is now too late 
to retire from the contest. There is no retreat but in submission and slavery! Our 
chains are forged!” (para. 5). The Declaration’s signatories evidently concurred. 
Having exhausted all alternate avenues, the colonies “must, therefore, acquiesce in 
the necessity, which denounces our Separation, and hold them, as we hold the rest 
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of mankind, Enemies in War, in Peace Friends” (para. 31). The language here is not 
that of hysteria, or even enthusiasm. The tone is resignation. 
Transcendent Natural Law  
Stating that rhetoric “does not deal with all things, but only with such as may or 
may not take place” (I.4.1359a), Aristotle situated the art within the realm of 
probability and adjudication. However, although rhetorical practice addresses a 
contingent world, a frequent objective is to foster a cogent sense of inescapability. 
I suggest that the Declaration, cloaked in the terminology of Natural Law, 
exemplifies this tactic. Jefferson’s task was to naturalize a discretionary political 
decision. To do so, he constructed several major premises from which the 
Declaration’s arguments could be derived in a fluent manner. In the resulting 
document, the revolutionization of (assumed tyrannical and therefore unnatural) 
colonial/Crown relations “is not one of interpretation but of observation” (Lucas, 
“The Stylistic” 1). Nodding to the current trend of empiricism, Henry asserted: “I 
have but one lamp by which my feet are guided, and that is the lamp of 
experience.” However, while the Declaration’s line of complaints against the Crown 
included matters of taxation, law, political interference, corruption and aggression, 
the document’s prime substance is its articulation (and defence) of an abstract 
notion of Natural Rights: 
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created 
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the 
pursuit of Happiness. — That to secure these rights, Governments 
are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the 
consent of the governed, — That whenever any Form of 
Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of 
the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new 
Government, laying its foundation on such principles and 
organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most 
likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. (para. 2) 
The unifying ideal amongst these Rights is the term “Liberty.” Implicit within the 
text is an argument that the new government arising from the ashes of the old will 
honour the Declaration’s stated principles. And should it fail, citizens are 
envisioned as empowered by Natural Law to rise again to overthrow future 
violations of their Rights. This idea of Natural Rights received a strong elaboration 
in Paine’s popular treatise: 
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The cause of America is, in a great measure, the cause of all 
mankind. Many circumstances have, and will arise, which are not 
local, but universal, and through which the principles of all lovers 
of mankind are affected, and in the event of which, their affections 
are interested. The laying a country desolate with fire and sword, 
declaring war against the natural rights of all mankind, and 
extirpating the defenders thereof from the face of the earth, is the 
concern of every man. (para. 4) 
“Mankind” is a circumscribed and exclusionary concept: Native peoples, 
white women and slaves were plainly excluded. The difficulties of clarifying the 
parameters of Natural Law is further demonstrated by the subsequent U.S. Civil 
War (initiated when the South attempted to ‘Declare Independence’), and 
persistent U.S. imperial ventures over the next 200 years. Yet despite its conflicted 
history, and notwithstanding robust loyalties to the Crown and country of birth, 
the narrative of Rights was and remains exceptionally powerful. Bound by Natural 
Law, the colonists were entreated to become “one people” (para. 1) and abandon 
the arbitrary and corrupt bonds that chained them to Great Britain. Here one finds 
the idea of America as shining city on the hill taking form. This is a heavy 
responsibility for a fledgling nation, but it is also (so the argument proceeds) 
inescapable. The revolutionary colonists’ ambitions are declared to emanate from 
universal human ontology; they wish simply “to assume among the powers of the 
earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s 
God entitle them.” The envisioned political order entails a specific configuration of 
bounded political membership (one entailing “sharp distinctions between the all 
men who are created equal and others who are excluded”) (Emerson 96). 
Nonetheless, thus characterized, revolution is assured. 
Resigned Inevitability 
Enlightenment notions of restraint clash with values conventionally championed 
during times of war. In advocating moderation whilst promoting armed conflict, 
the Declaration threaded a convoluted line. This paradox echoes a broader 
incongruity in eighteenth century North Atlantic thought regarding tensions 
between an assumed natural order and human freedom, a tension whereat 
“equality collides with liberty” (Emerson 79). The Declaration effaces this 
dissonance, and it does so with rhetorical force and skill. In the above reading, I 
have attempted to illuminate several core features of the document’s rhetorical 
work. As an example of exceptional propaganda, this brief text justified war in 
forceful terms. In so doing, it also constituted the grounds for a novel imagined 
national community. My focus, however, has been how the Declaration epitomizes 
the rhetoric of inevitability. Dating back to Aristotle’s foundational work, rhetoric 
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has often been conceptualized as the art of negotiating contingencies. A 
contested and uncertain proposition in the 1776 colonies, the American 
Revolutionary War constituted a fertile context for rhetorical action. Created within 
this environment, the Declaration was a situated, polyphonic rhetorical gesture, 
targeted to both European governments and those colonists whose allegiance was 
unsettled. However, its core rhetorical strategy was to obfuscate its political 
motivations – to position itself as a dispassionate philosophical, as opposed to 
rhetorical, text. I suggest that the cultivation of perceived inevitability may be a 
fundamental aspiration of rhetorical practice; while not all appeals couch their 
terms in the absolute language of divinity, physics, or mathematics, all rhetorical 
practice aims to enact influence (broadly understood). Always grounded in 
ideology, rhetoric clothes itself in a manner designed to achieve a desired 
evaluation. Battles over reason and its grounds have constituted the heart of 
Western public deliberation for several centuries. By mobilizing an Enlightenment 
and Deist inspired abstract notion of Reason tied to universal Natural Law, the 
Declaration of Independence was crafted to maximize the revolutionaries’ 
rhetorical force. The resulting document reaches into both past and future, and 
exemplifies the power of consummate rhetorics of resigned inevitability.  
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